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Behavioral flexibility is the hallmark of goal-directed
behavior. Whereas a great deal is known about the
neural substrates of behavioral adjustment when it
is explicitly cued by features of the external environ-
ment, little is knownabout howweadapt our behavior
when such changes are made on the basis of uncer-
tain evidence. Using a Bayesian reinforcement-
learning model and fMRI, we show that frontopolar
cortex (FPC) tracks the relative advantage in favor
of switching to a foregone alternative when choices
are made voluntarily. Changes in FPC functional
connectivity occur when subjects finally decide to
switch to the alternative behavior. Moreover, interin-
dividual variation in the FPC signal predicts interindi-
vidual differences in effectively adapting behavior.
By contrast, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
encodes the relative value of the current decision.
Collectively, these findings reveal complementary
prefrontal computations essential for promoting
short- and long-term behavioral flexibility.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to adapt behavior to suit the current environment is
central to survival in a changing world. Much experimental work
has been devoted to unraveling the neural mechanisms that
underpin adaptive behavior when such changes are explicitly in-
structed either by external stimuli (Grol et al., 2006; Passingham,
2008; Schluter et al., 1998; Toni et al., 2001; Wise et al., 1997) or
previously learned response strategies (Genovesio et al., 2005;
Genovesio and Wise, 2008; Miller and Buschman, 2008; Wise,
2008).However, in everyday life, organismsmust oftendetermine
what to do in the absence of such explicit cues. In such contexts,
adaptive behavior might depend upon tracking the evidence in
favor of current and alternative courses of action.
It is nowwell established that frontopolar cortex (FPC) is active
when human subjects switch between one complex behavioral
task and another, particularly when it is necessary to hold infor-
mation about one task in working memory when switching to the
alternative (Braver et al., 2003; Koechlin et al., 1999; Koechlinand Hyafil, 2007; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; Ramnani
and Owen, 2004). Typically, such experiments provide partici-
pants with explicit instructions about when to switch from one
task to another. Yet whether or how the FPC contributes to the
control of behavior when participants freely select between
tasks or even between simple choices remains unclear.
Furthermore, it is established that other brain areas, particu-
larly in the parietal cortex, are active during cued behavioral
switching (Braver et al., 2003; Glascher et al., 2009; Jubault
et al., 2007; Rushworth et al., 2001). However, the distinct contri-
butions of, and interplay between, parietal and frontopolar cortex
during behavioral switching have proven elusive (Daw et al.,
2006; Glascher et al., 2009).
We addressed these issues by examining human FPC activity
while subjects freely selected between two actions during
a simple decision-making task. Crucially, no explicit instructions
signaling behavioral change were provided. Because our focus
was on how subjects adapt behavior based on uncertain
evidence, rather than on other aspects of task control, subjects
were not required to switch between complex behavioral tasks
but simply between one of two possible actions on the basis of
the expected values of reward associated with the actions.
The expected value of each action was in turn a function of the
probability that it would yield rewards if chosen (which the
subject must estimate from recent outcomes) and themagnitude
of reward associated with the action (which was indicated on the
task screen on each trial and changed unpredictably from trial to
trial). A Bayesian model was used to infer subject estimates of
the outcome probabilities. By carefully decorrelating the critical
parameters (probabilities and expected values of chosen and
unchosen options) across trials, we were able to regress these
parameters against the blood oxygenation level-dependent
(BOLD) signal acquired during functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). By further dissociating different stages of the
decision-making process within a trial in time, we could assess
both the short-term representation of variables crucial to the
current decision (option expected values) and the extended
representation of variables important for future decisions (option
reward probabilities).
Here, we show that the FPC continually tracked the evidence
accumulated in favor of switching to the alternative course of
action. Moreover, immediately before a behavioral switch actu-
ally occurred, the FPC entered into a distinct pattern of functional
connectivity with the parietal cortex, suggesting that when theNeuron 62, 733–743, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 733
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FPC and Alternative Courses of ActionFigure 1. Two-Armed Bandit Task and
Representative Probability and Value Esti-
mates
(A) Representative trial and timeline. Subjects per-
formed a two-armed bandit task in which they
chose between left and right options on the basis
of past outcomes and the reward magnitudes
(yellow numbers). If the subject’s choice was re-
warded, the red prize bar at the bottom of the
screen moved toward the silver and gold targets
at the bottom right of the screen in proportion to
the chosen reward magnitude. If the red prize
bar reached the silver target, subjects earned
£20; if it reached the yellow target, they earned
£30. In this example, the subject’s choice was re-
warded, so the red prize bar moved toward the
targets by a distance in proportion to 55 points.
If the subject’s choice was not rewarded, the red
prize bar remained the same (also shown). Impor-
tantly, no feedback was given on the unselected
option. Times displayed on the timeline refer to
mean onset times for each event across trials
and subjects.
(B) Left panel: probabilities associated with the left
and right options being rewarded are shown in
black and green, respectively, for one subject.
Right panel: probabilities associated with the
chosen and unchosen options being rewarded
are shown for the same subject in blue and red,
respectively. These reward probabilities were esti-
mated from the observed outcomes of each indi-
vidual subject’s choices by a Bayesian reinforce-
ment learning algorithm (see Supplemental Data).
(C) Left panel: expected values associated with
the left and right options are shown in purple and
silver, respectively. Right panel: expected values
associated with the chosen and unchosen options
are shown in yellow and cyan, respectively, for the
same subject.
(D) Regression coefficients relating to the differ-
ence between model-estimated reward probabili-
ties from the current trial (RPi), the difference
between random reward magnitudes from the
current trial (RMi), and the difference between
random reward magnitudes from the previous trial
(RMi-1). Error bars represent ±SEM.FPC has recruited sufficient evidence to support a behavioral
switch, it engages the parietal cortex to implement the switch.
These data isolate a distinct computation performed by the
FPC in the service of behavioral flexibility, even in situations in
which choices are made voluntarily, and suggest a new account
of frontal lobe activity in decision making.
RESULTS
Experimental Design
Participants performed a decision-making task in which they
repeatedly chose between left and right options by making734 Neuron 62, 733–743, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.left- or right-hand button presses (Figure 1A). The task was
modeled on one previously used by Behrens and colleagues
(Behrens et al., 2007). By changing a key task parameter—the
statistical independence between options—it was possible to
pursue a completely distinct experimental goal. Instead of
focusing on the rate of learning (as in the previous study), this
feature of the experimental design enabled us to examine the
neural correlates of alternative courses of action. On each trial,
random integers between 1 and 100 were displayed, one in the
center of the rectangle denoting each option, that indicated
the size of reward available for taking that option. Subjects
were informed that because these reward magnitudes were
Neuron
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possible to track them across trials. However, participants
were not explicitly cued about the probability that each option
would be rewarded if chosen. Instead, subjects were told that
these reward probabilities depended only on the recent outcome
history and could therefore be tracked across trials. To simulate
a changing environment, these underlying reward probabilities
drifted from trial to trial during the course of the experiment
(Figure 1B).
We implemented an optimal Bayesian learner (Behrens
et al., 2007) to model subject estimates of the probabilities
of reward associated with the chosen and unchosen options
given the history of recent choice outcomes (i.e., rewarded
or unrewarded) (see Supplemental Data). To confirm that the
Bayesian model captured human behavior in our task, we
used logistic regression to determine the extent to which
subject choices were influenced by optimally tracked outcome
probabilities and by the reward magnitudes that changed
randomly on each trial. This analysis confirmed that subject
choices were significantly influenced by the difference
between the model-derived reward probabilities on the current
trial [t(17) = 5.73, p < 0.0001] and the difference in reward
magnitudes on the current trial [t(17) = 4.9, p < 0.0002]
(Figure 1D). The relative reward magnitude on the current trial
should influence choice, but the reward magnitudes on
previous trials should theoretically not have any effect because
they changed randomly from trial to trial. Consistent with the
model, there was no significant effect of the difference in
reward magnitudes from the previous trial on subject choices
[t(17)0.85, p > 0.20] (Figure 1D), indicating that subject
behavior did not reflect any attempt to track the random reward
magnitudes.
Crucially, the Bayesian learner enabled us to select a reward
schedule that decorrelated the reward probabilities associated
with left and right options (subsequently referred to as action
probabilities). Because we could not know what choices our
participants would ultimately make, this step was critical, as it
increased the likelihood that chosen and unchosen action prob-
abilities would also be decorrelated (Figure 1B). As predicted,
there was indeed little correlation between the model-estimated
left and right action probabilities (mean signed r2 across
subjects = 0.08, SD = 0.09) or between chosen and unchosen
action probabilities (mean signed r2 = 0.10, SD = 0.09). Simi-
larly, the expected value (reward probability 3 reward magni-
tude) associated with left and right options (subsequently
referred to as action values) were decorrelated, which also
increased the likelihood that chosen and unchosen action values
would be decorrelated (Figure 1C). Accordingly, there was
limited correlation between the model-estimated left and right
action values (mean signed r2 = 0.02, SD = 0.01) and between
chosen and unchosen action values (mean signed r2 = 0.11,
SD = 0.09) (Figure S1; see Table S1 for individual subject corre-
lations). It is important to emphasize that while action values
(which are a function of both reward probability and magnitude)
were relevant for making a decision on any given trial, the
random trial-by-trial fluctuations in reward magnitude meant
that longer-term behavioral strategies depended only on action
probabilities.The FPC Tracks the Relative Advantage Associated
with the Alternative Course of Action
If it is true that a brain region encodes the long-term evidence
accumulated in support of a switch in behavior, then it should
encode the relative evidence in favor of the alternative action.
To search for such a neural signal, we tested for regions
throughout the whole brain where activity correlated with the
log-ratio between the model-estimated unchosen and chosen
action probabilities or the relative unchosen probability—the
relevant parameter to track through and across trials to inform
switches to the alternative course of action in our task. This anal-
ysis, which used standard corrections for multiple comparisons
across the whole brain (Smith et al., 2004), revealed bilateral
regions of lateral FPC whose activity tracked the relative
unchosen probability (Z = 3.89, MNI x = 34, y = 56, z = 8,
Z = 3.34, x = 36, y = 54, z = 0) (Figure 2A; Table S2). Region
of interest (ROI) analyses demonstrated that the FPC signal
correlates with the relative unchosen probability throughout the
length of the trial, with peaks occurring at two time points: during
the decision-making period and in the intertrial interval (ITI)
(Figure 2B). Notably, taking the difference between probabilities,
rather than the log-ratio, revealed virtually identical activations
and time series of correlation (Figure S2). We therefore do not
make a strong claim about exactly what function of probability
is coded in FPC. However, we do have strong evidence that
this function increases monotonically with relative unchosen
probability (Figure 2C).
The correlation between FPC signal and relative unchosen
probability is not driven by the current behavioral choice; the
effect survived the inclusion of binary indicator confound regres-
sors that coded for exploratory versus exploitative decisions,
switching versus staying, and left versus right choices
(Figure S3). Furthermore, separating the relative unchosen prob-
ability into its component parts revealed a positive correlation
with the unchosen action probability and a negative correlation
with the chosen action probability (Figure 2B), demonstrating
that the FPC does indeed encode a relative signal. Although
negative fMRI findings must be interpreted with caution, we
did not observe any region whose activity correlated significantly
with either the chosen or unchosen action probability in isolation.
In addition, the FPC was not sensitive to the relative difference
between unchosen and chosen reward magnitudes [t(17) < 0.4,
p > 0.4]. Intriguingly, the FPC signal scales with the relative un-
chosen probability on both stay [t(17) = 2.32, p < 0.05] and switch
trials [t(17) = 2.65, p < 0.01] (Figure 2C), indicating that even
before subjects have responded, the FPC already encodes the
evidence in favor of the option that will soon become unchosen
after subjects switch. In other words, the FPC changes its frame
of reference in terms of which action is chosen even before
subjects adapt their behavior. The second peak in the FPC
signal, which occurs after the completion of a decision on one
trial, contains the evidence in favor of a behavioral switch on
the following trial.
Within- and Between-Subject Variation in the FPC
Signal Predicts Switching to the Alternative Action
The FPC codes the relative evidence in favor of the alternative
behavior even in the period after a decision is made and itsNeuron 62, 733–743, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 735
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FPC and Alternative Courses of ActionFigure 2. The Frontopolar Cortex Tracks
the Relative Unchosen Probability
(A) Axial and coronal slices through z-statistic
maps relating to the relative unchosen probability
[log(unchosen action probability/chosen action
probability)]. Z-statistic maps are corrected for
multiple comparisons across the whole-brain by
means of cluster-based Gaussian random-field
correction at p < 0.05. Maps are displayed accord-
ing to radiological convention. Colorbar indicates
Z-score.
(B) Top panel: time course for the effect size of the
relative unchosen probability in the FPC is shown
throughout the duration of the trial. Bottom panel:
the same time course is shown with the signal
decomposed into log unchosen and log chosen
action probabilities. There is a positive correlation
with log unchosen probability and a negative
correlation with log chosen probability. Thick lines:
mean effect sizes. Shadows: standard error of the
mean (±SEM).
(C) The bar plots show the mean BOLD percent
signal change in the FPC, with trials binned by
the relative unchosen probability into quartiles
such that each bin has an equivalent number of
trials on all trials (top), stay trials (middle), and
switch trials (bottom). Error bars represent ± SEM.outcome has been presented. Such a signal may be viewed as
a neural representation of the evidence in favor of switching
behavior at the following trial. This interpretation makes strong
and testable predictions about the effect of this signal on
behavior. First, within subjects, the FPC signal during the ITI
might predict switching on the following trial. Second, subjects
in whom this evidence is poorly represented should not switch
to the alternative behavior at appropriate times.
We tested these predictions in two complementary ways.
First, we assessed whether greater FPC activity at any point of
the current trial predicted switching on the following trial.
Remarkably, even though reward magnitudes were not yet re-
vealed to subjects, the FPC signal between trials correlated
with switching on the following trial [Figure 3A; t(17) = 2.1, p <
0.05]. It is likely that this correlation would have been stronger
had reward probabilities been the only source of information
guiding subject decisions on the upcoming trial. Second, we
assessed whether variation across subjects in the FPC signal
during the ITI predicted switching to the alternative when it
was the more valuable option. Because reward magnitudes
might render the more probable option less valuable on a given
trial, switching to the previously unchosen option would only be
advantageous when it also has the higher expected value. We
reasoned that if the FPC signal between trials is guiding
switches, then variation in this signal across subjects should
predict switching when it is advantageous on the following trial.
As predicted, subjects with a greater effect of the relative un-
chosen probability in the FPC during the ITI were more likely to
switch to the more valuable option (Figure 3B).
We further reasoned that subjects with a stronger representa-
tion of relative unchosen probability in the FPC would be more
likely to behave as if they retained this value accurately. We
therefore sought to explain behavior in each subject by two736 Neuron 62, 733–743, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.competing models. The first (OPTIMAL) leaked information
about the unchosen probability at an optimal rate. In our task,
the subject does not receive feedback about rewards that would
have been available on the unchosen option. Therefore, optimal
behavior is for the estimate of the unchosen option’s probability
to decay to chance levels (0.5) at a rate determined by the vola-
tility of the environment (Supplemental Data) (Behrens et al.,
2007). In the second model (LEAKY), estimates of the unchosen
probability decay at a faster rate (Supplemental Data). The extent
to which a subject’s behavior is better predicted by OPTIMAL
than LEAKY is a measure of how accurately the subject retains
information about the unchosen option across trials. We there-
fore used a logistic regression analysis in which these two
models would compete to describe subject behavior. We
computed the ratio of the regression coefficients from the
logistic regression to give b; the extent to which a subject’s
behavior is better fit by OPTIMAL than by LEAKY. Individuals
with a greater effect of unchosen probability in the FPC during
the ITI had higher b values (Figure 3C). Taken together, these
within- and between-subject correlations suggest that the FPC
not only maintains the evidence in favor of switching but also
might play a role in implementing switches to foregone options.
Implementation of the Behavioral Switch: Functional
Connectivity between FPC and Parietal
and Premotor Regions
In addition to the FPC, our whole-brain analysis of the relative un-
chosen probability identified bilateral regions midway along the
intraparietal sulcus, bordering the inferior parietal lobule (mid-
IPS) (Z = 3.89, MNI x = 50, y = 46, z = 46, Z = 3.69, x = 32,
y = 60, z = 52) (Figure 4A). A similar mid-IPS region has previ-
ously been reported to be coactive with the FPC during explor-
atory behavior (Daw et al., 2006), although the difference in the
Neuron
FPC and Alternative Courses of Actionfunctions of the two regions has been difficult to establish.
Dividing trials into switch and stay trials, however, revealed
that while the FPC encoded the relative unchosen probability
monotonically on all trials (Figure 2C), the mid-IPS correlated
with the relative unchosen probability on switch trials only
(Figure 4B) (repeated-measures ANOVA for interaction between
regression coefficients relating to the relative unchosen proba-
Figure 3. Frontopolor Cortex Activity during the ITI Predicts Within-
and Between-Subject Variability in Behavior
(A) FPC effect of switching on the following trial plotted from the time of
outcome presentation on the current trial to the time of outcome presentation
on the following trial. There is a significant effect of switching on the following
trial during the ITI. The time course plot is displayed according to the same
conventions used in Figure 2.
(B and C) Left column: time series of between-subject correlation (signed r2)
between the effect size in the FPC and the proportion of trials on which
subjects switched to the better option (B) and the ratio of the fit between
models incorporating optimally retained or quickly forgotten estimates of an
unchosen action’s probability, b (C). The correlation is shown at every time
point in the trial, plotted from the time of outcome presentation on the current
trial to the time of outcome presentation on the following trial. Right column:
scatter plots were produced by fitting a hemodynamic model in each subject
to the time course of the effect in the FPC. For this model, a canonical hemo-
dynamic response function was time locked to the start of the intertrial interval.
The corresponding effect size (i.e., regression coefficient) for the relative un-
chosen probability in the FPC during the ITI for each subject was then plotted
against the proportion of trials when a subject switched as a fraction of the
trials when it would have been advantageous to switch (A) and b (B).bility on switch and stay trials: F1,17 = 4.6, p < 0.05; relative un-
chosen probability on switch trials only: t(17) = 3.2, p < 0.005;
relative unchosen probability on stay trials only: t(17) < .5, p >
0.4). Given this region’s proposed role in action updating and
behavioral switching (Glascher et al., 2009; Jubault et al.,
2007; Rushworth et al., 2001), this observation raised the possi-
bility that the FPCmight convey the amount of evidence favoring
switches to the mid-IPS and related regions responsible for
implementing a switch in behavior.
We reasoned that since the FPC accumulates the evidence in
favor of switching across all trial types and predicts switches
within and between participants, it might transmit this evidence
to other brain regions when there is sufficient evidence to
support a switch in behavior before switches actually occur. To
test this hypothesis, we performed a functional connectivity
analysis designed to ask the following question: where in the
brain is there a change in interactionwith the FPC and the relative
unchosen probability, specifically before switches are made?
Importantly, this is the specific temporal window during which
we would expect brain regions to prepare to implement
switches. The right parietal cortex and interconnected right
ventral premotor cortex (PMv) (Matelli et al., 1986; Rushworth
et al., 2006) showed enhanced functional connectivity with the
right FPC that was dependent on the estimated size of the
relative unchosen probability, specifically before switches in
behavior took place (Z = 3.41, MNI x = 48, y = 42, z = 44)
(Figure 4C). Although no regions survived thresholding when
we investigated functional connectivity with the left FPC, the
left parietal cortex and PMv survived the reduced threshold of
Z > 2.8, p < 0.005, uncorrected (Figure S4). Importantly, because
the psychological regressor (the relative unchosen probability
preceding switches) and the physiological regressor (the FPC
timeseries) were included in the general linearmodel for the func-
tional connectivity analysis, these activations were not due to the
psychological or physiological regressors alone but to their
interaction. Notably, the parietal region exhibiting enhanced
functional connectivity overlappedwith themid-IPS region found
to code for the relative unchosen probability on switch trials
(Figures 4A and 4C). Consistent with the proposal that this region
plays a role in behavioral switching (Glascher et al., 2009; Jubault
et al., 2007; Rushworth et al., 2001), ROI analyses also revealed
a main effect of switching during the decision-making phase in
the mid-IPS in the current study [t(17) = 4.0, p < 0.001]. Although
it is not possible to determine whether the FPC or IPS is driving
the interaction from the functional connectivity analysis alone,
these analyses, in conjunction with the findings that the FPC
predicts switching both within and between subjects and
encodes the evidence advocating a switch on both stay and
switch trials, while the IPS only encodes this information before
switches, strongly suggest that the FPC both represents the
evidence supporting selection of the unchosen option and trans-
mits the information to the mid-IPS and PMv in order to imple-
ment switches.
The Evidence in Favor of the Current Decision
Because of their relatively slow rate of change, reward probabil-
ities were relevant for tracking the long-term evidence accumu-
lated in favor of different choice strategies. However, on anyNeuron 62, 733–743, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 737
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reward probability but also by the reward magnitude—that is,
choices should be a function of the (subjective) action values
(Supplemental Data). Previous fMRI data have implicated
a region of the vmPFC in coding for the expected value of the
chosen action or for related variables (Behrens et al., 2008;
Daw et al., 2006; Hampton et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008; Kable
and Glimcher, 2007; Knutson et al., 2005; Plassmann et al.,
2007; Tanaka et al., 2004). These studies have not, however,
investigated how this signal might depend upon alternative,
competing actions. If it is true that this signal encodes a decision
between maintaining and adapting behavior, then it should
encode the evidence in favor of the chosen action. A second
general linear model (GLM) was therefore constructed to search
for brain regions whose activity correlated with the difference
between the chosen and unchosen subjective expected values,
or the relative chosen value. The only region across the entire
brain to survive thresholding was located in the vmPFC (max
Z = 3.75, at MNI x = 6, y = 48, z = 8) (Figure 5A) (Table S2).
ROI analysis revealed that the vmPFC encoded the relative
chosen value during the decision period and not at any other
Figure 4. Functional Connectivity between FPC and Mid-IPS and
Premotor Regions
(A) Sagittal slices through z-statistic maps relating to the relative unchosen
probability.
(B) Bar plots showing mean mid-IPS BOLD responses, binned by the relative
unchosen probability across all trials (top), stay trials (middle), and switch trials
(bottom). The mid-IPS only correlates linearly with the relative unchosen prob-
ability on switch trials.
Images in (A) and (B) are displayed according to the same conventions used
in Figure 2.
(C) Functional connectivity analysis. Sagittal slice through z-statistic map
showing regions that interact with the right FPC signal and the relative un-
chosen probability before switches are made. Z-statistic map in (C) is dis-
played with a voxel-wise threshold of Z > 3.1, p < 0.001 uncorrected.738 Neuron 62, 733–743, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.time point in the trial (Figure 5B). Furthermore, separating the
relative chosen value into its component parts revealed a positive
correlation with chosen action value and a negative correlation
with unchosen action value, demonstrating that, like the FPC,
the vmPFC encodes a relative signal (Figure 5B). However, while
the FPC tracked the relative unchosen probability, the vmPFC
signal correlated best with the relative chosen value. As with
the probability-based analysis, no region’s activity correlated
significantly with either the chosen or unchosen action value in
isolation. Finally, by including decorrelated measures of both
reward probability and reward magnitude in our experimental
design (Figure S1), we were able to demonstrate that the vmPFC
encodes both metrics monotonically during the time of the deci-
sion [effect of reward probability: t(17) = 2.23, p < 0.05; effect of
reward magnitude: t(17) = 2.48, p < 0.05] (Figure 5C).
DISCUSSION
This study reveals the specific computations performed by
human FPC in service of behavioral flexibility during voluntary
choice. We have shown that the FPC is not just active when
a change in behavior occurs but that it continually and monoton-
ically tracks the long-term evidence accrued to support a switch
in behavior both during decisions and in the intervals between
trials (Figure 2). Moreover, rather than passively monitoring these
parameters without consequence for behavior, ROI analyses
indicated that the greater the effect size in the FPC between
trials, the more likely subjects were to appropriately switch their
behavior on the next trial (Figure 3). Finally, changes in functional
connectivity between the FPC and parietal and premotor regions
occur immediately before switches to the alternative actually
take place (Figures 4 and S4). These findings demonstrate a
pivotal role for the FPC in promoting behavioral flexibility, even
when decisions are made voluntarily. Furthermore, that vmPFC
encodes the relative value of the current decision suggests that
vmPFC and FPC may perform key complementary roles during
decision making.
There is an emerging view that complex behavior can be
understood with respect to hierarchical organized systems for
action selection (Bunge et al., 2005; Koechlin and Jubault,
2006; Koechlin et al., 2003; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007).
According to this perspective, functions of lateral frontal cortex
can be described in relation to a rostral-caudal functional axis
with increasing complexity in increasingly rostral brain regions.
Along this axis caudal regions select actions on the basis of
learned associations with simple cues, intermediate areas are re-
cruited when the significance of a cue is contextually dependent,
while more rostral regions subserve additional control related
to cues provided from a previous temporal episode. In other
words, these more rostral regions are employed when the rules
for action selection change with task context or episode. By
contrast, it has been argued that FPC maintains representations
based on past experience but relating to potential future or
‘‘pending’’ behavioral states (Koechlin, 2008; Koechlin and Hya-
fil, 2007). Although FPC activity has previously been reported
when cue, context, and episodic contingencies are insufficient
to guide behavior, the present study demonstrates a role for FPC
even when these contingencies are absent and the behavioral
Neuron
FPC and Alternative Courses of ActionFigure 5. The Ventromedial PFC Encodes the Relative Chosen Value during the Decision-Making Phase
(A) Sagittal and coronal slices through z-statistic maps relating to the relative chosen value (chosen – unchosen expected value).
(B) Top panel: time course for the effect size of the relative chosen value in the vmPFC is shown throughout the duration of the trial. Bottom panel: the same time
course is shownwith the signal decomposed into chosen and unchosen action values. There is a positive correlation with chosen value and a negative correlation
with unchosen value during the decision-making phase.
(C) Bar plots showing mean vmPFC BOLD responses, binned by relative chosen value (chosen – unchosen expected value) (top), relative chosen probability
(chosen – unchosen probability) (middle), and relative chosen magnitude (chosen – unchosen magnitude) (bottom). Images are displayed according to the
same conventions used in Figure 2.task involves simple responses but where response selection is
based on uncertain evidence. Despite the absence of these
contingencies, the evidence in favor of a pending behavioral
state is estimated on the basis of past experience by the FPC
in the current task. The FPC thus encodes information pertaining
to potential but still temporally distant episodes of behavior
(Koechlin, 2008; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007).
It should be noted that, in our experimental task, there was no
advantage to tracking reward magnitudes from one trial to the
next. Consistent with this feature of the task design, subject
decisions were not influenced by reward magnitudes from the
past trial (Figure 1D). The only information guiding expectations
about future behavior were therefore the reward probabilities
associated with the options. The FPC signal uncovered in the
current study may thus be conceived of as encoding the relative
expectation of reward associated with the unchosen compared
to the chosen option at the upcoming trial. Such an evidence-
based signal should theoretically guide switching on the forth-
coming trial, a hypothesis supported by correlations between
both intra- and intersubject variability in FPC activity and switch-
ing behavior (Figures 3A and 3B).
The FPC has been implicated in multitasking (Braver et al.,
2003; Burgess, 2000; Burgess et al., 2000; Koechlin et al.,
1999, 2000), prospective memory (Burgess et al., 2003; Sakai
and Passingham, 2006; Sakai et al., 2002), and relational
reasoning (Bunge et al., 2005; Prabhakaran et al., 2000; Wen-delken et al., 2008). These functions all require the maintenance
of a ‘‘pending’’ task set or of information while another behavior
is ongoing (Koechlin et al., 1999; Koechlin andHyafil, 2007; Ram-
nani and Owen, 2004). However, these previous studies all
provided explicit cues or rules instructing subjects when to
switch to the pending representation. The current findings
show that the FPC plays a general role in representing a pending
or alternative potential course of action in order to determine
when to switch to that behavior, independently of whether
such switches are externally instructed or voluntary, and inde-
pendently of the complexity of the pending behavior. Moreover,
they demonstrate that FPC is not merely more active at the point
of switching but, first, that it continually tracks the evidence
favoring a switch in behavior and, second, that it enters into
a distinct pattern of functional connectivity with parietal and pre-
motor regions as the switch in behavior actually occurs. Previous
studies have reported changes in functional interactions
between FPC and other brain regions when specific instructions
to change the way tasks are performed are given to subjects
(Sakai and Passingham, 2006; Sakai et al., 2002), but the present
results suggest that an equally important function of the FPC is
to accumulate evidence for when a switch will be needed and
then to functionally interact with other brain regions even when
explicit instructions to switch are not provided.
It is noteworthy that medial area 10 in the macaque monkey
does not possess efferent projections to parietal cortex (PetridesNeuron 62, 733–743, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 739
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10, terminal label was identified just posterior to the arcuate
sulcus in PMv, a region which possesses dense projections to
the parietal region identified by our functional connectivity ana-
lysis (Matelli et al., 1986; Rushworth et al., 2006). It is therefore
plausible that PMv, which was also activated in our functional
connectivity analysis, served as a relay region to transmit the
evidence favoring switches from FPC to parietal cortex. Another
route that could potentially mediate the influence of the FPC on
the parietal cortexmight run via the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Petrides and Pandya, 2007; Cavada andGoldman-Rakic, 1989).
We note that some changes in dorsolateral prefrontal activity
were identified by the PPI analysis, but they remained below
the threshold for statistical significance. Given that there is
some evidence that the FPC and mid-IPS region are dispropor-
tionally expanded in the human brain (Husain and Nachev, 2007;
Semendeferi et al., 2001), it is also possible that other routes
between these regions may be found to exist in the human.
In addition, the FPC has recently been implicated in explora-
tion (Burgess et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2006; Yoshida and Ishii,
2006). In particular, one recent study identified a network of
regions including similar FPC and mid-IPS regions when
subjects forewent the most valuable option in order to ‘‘explore’’
alternatives in a changing environment (Daw et al., 2006). While
such activation patterns have been interpreted as indicative of
a neural mechanism for efficient sampling of a changing environ-
ment, it is nevertheless the case that it is on these trials that fore-
gone options have particularly high value. The present results
begin to explain the nature of FPC’s contribution to exploration
and how it is distinguished from that of mid-IPS. Specifically,
the present study demonstrated that FPC monotonically
encodes the evidence in favor of the alternative behavior across
all trial types, whether the decision is to switch or stay, to explore
or exploit. Moreover, the FPC enters into an altered pattern of
interaction with the mid-IPS that is dependent on the estimated
size of the relative unchosen probability only on switch trials.
Unlike the FPC, the mid-IPS only encodes the evidence in favor
of switching immediately before switches actually occur. Our
data therefore suggest that FPC’s andmid-IPS’s proposed roles
in exploration might be best understood in terms of continually
tracking the evidence in favor of switching to an alternative
behavior and intermittently implementing switches to that alter-
native, respectively.
Our experimental design enabled us to dissociate long-term
signals accumulated across trials from short-term signals that
should reflect decisions on the current trial. Whereas the FPC
tracked the strategic advantage of switching to a foregone alter-
native across trials, the vmPFC encoded the relative advantage
of the current decision on a given trial. Activity in vmPFC has
previously been shown to correlate with parameters associated
with the value of a chosen option (Daw et al., 2006; Hampton
et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007). However, it has not
been possible to disentangle precisely which features of deci-
sions are encoded by vmPFC. By minimizing the correlation
between candidate parameters, we were able to demonstrate
that the vmPFC encodes the relative chosen value, or the
value-based evidence in favor of selecting the chosen option,
during repetitive decision making. Notably, vmPFC sensitivity740 Neuron 62, 733–743, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.to competing but unchosen options suggests that neural activity
in this region may underlie the sensitivity of behavior to opportu-
nity costs that has been emphasized in economics (McConnell
and Brue, 2004). This perspective accords well with recent
demonstrations that vmPFC and other prefrontal regions are
sensitive to both potential gains and costs during decision
making (Hare et al., 2008; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Kim
et al., 2008; Rushworth et al., 2007; Tanaka et al., 2004; Tom
et al., 2007). Our findings are therefore broadly consistent with
the notion that vmPFC encodes the subjective value of the
chosen option during the decision (Kable and Glimcher, 2007).
However, in the present study, the overall value parameter incor-
porates the opportunity cost associated with not selecting alter-
native actions.
Striatal and orbitofrontal neurons in macaque monkeys have
been shown to be sensitive to the chosen value when choices
are made between actions and goods, respectively (Lau and
Glimcher, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008). It
has been suggested that such signals might provide the pre-
dicted value component of prediction error signals in dopami-
nergic neurons crucial for learning (Lau and Glimcher, 2008). It
should be noted, however, that striatal coding of chosen value
predominately occurs at the time of reward delivery and has
not been shown to depend on the value of the alternative action
(Lau and Glimcher, 2008). By contrast, the vmPFC signal re-
vealed here occurs at the time of the decision and encodes the
value of the chosen relative to the unchosen action. Although
the positive component of this signal may contribute to predic-
tion error computation, it is also possible that vmPFC encodes
the subjective value of a choice—here, a decision reflecting
the relative merits of maintaining or switching behavior.
Although relatively little is known of the activity of neurons in
the vmPFC of monkeys, a relative value signal has been identi-
fied in an adjacent and anatomically interconnected region, the
central orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), during a delayed response
task (in the absence of a decision) when the same two reinforce-
ments were presented repeatedly within a block of trials (Trem-
blay and Schultz, 1999). Although the OFC signal may change
when the same options are not repeatedly paired with one
another (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008), it is conceivable
that the relative chosen value signal uncovered in the vmPFC
in the present study reflects afferent input from OFC among
other areas. Another distinct possibility is that chosen and un-
chosen action and offer value signals are integrated in the
vmPFC, a region anatomically positioned to send and receive
information to and from the striatum and the OFC (Carmichael
and Price, 1996; Ferry et al., 2000; Haber, 2003; Parent, 1986).
It has been proposed that organisms are able to change their
behavioral patterns flexibly simply by choosing actions accord-
ing to their expected returns (Bogacz, 2007; Dayan and Abbott,
2001; Sutton and Barto, 1998). While it is easy to see how this
strategy might generate adaptive behavior, it requires evaluation
and comparison of every possible action at each decision point.
Such continual evaluation and comparison would come at the
price of a heavy computational load when there are multiple
alternatives to choose between. An alternative strategy capable
of generating similar behavior is for the animal to continue along
a behavioral policy until evidence has accumulated in favor
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making mechanism are far from clear, it is possible that only at
times of potential switches must the animal perform a compar-
ison between available actions. Because the present study em-
ployed a two-alternative choice task, it cannot arbitrate between
these two theories of neural coding during repetitive choice.
Nevertheless, the FPC signal identified in the current study could
potentially accumulate the evidence in favor of a future switch in
such a decision-making model.
FPC and vmPFC perform complementary computations
during voluntary decision making. Whereas FPC encodes the
long-termevidence collected in favor of adapting futurebehavior,
vmPFC encodes a short-term signal reflecting a comparison
between the currently chosen and alternative actions. The exis-
tence of such signals suggests a novel mechanism for deciding
whether or not it is worth adapting or maintaining decisions.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Twenty-one healthy volunteers participated in the fMRI experiment. Two
volunteers reported discovering and using a nonexistent relationship between
the cued reward magnitudes and the rewarded choice, so their data were dis-
carded. An additional participant’s data was discarded due to poor echoplanar
imaging data quality resulting from gradient coil malfunction. The resulting
18 subjects (8 women, mean age = 27.3 years, standard deviation 3.7 years)
were included in all further analyses. All participants gave informed consent
in accordance with the National Health Service Oxfordshire Central Office
for Research Ethics Committees (07/Q1603/11).
Experimental Task
In our fMRI task, subjects decided repeatedly between left and right options
based on their expectation of reward and the number of points associated
with each option (Figure 1A). When the yellow question mark appeared in
the center of the screen, subjects indicated their choices with left- and right-
hand index finger responses for left and right options, respectively. After
subjects indicated their decision, the chosen option was highlighted by
a gray rectangle that framed the chosen green rectangle, and subjects awaited
the outcome. If the subject’s choice was rewarded, a green tick appeared in
the center of the screen and the red prize bar also updated toward the silver
and gold rectangular targets in proportion to the amount of points won on
that trial during the outcome phase. Subjects were rewarded with £20 if the
prize bar reached the silver target and £30 if it reached the gold target. No
subject failed to reach the first target. If the subject’s choice was not rewarded,
a red X appeared in the center of the screen. Importantly, there was no feed-
back given for the unselected option. Each trial consisted of a decide phase
(4.5–7.5 s jittered + reaction time) during which subjects made the decision
and response; an interval phase (4.5–7.5 s jittered) during which subjects
awaited the outcome of their decision; and an outcome phase (3 s) during
which the outcome (rewarded or unrewarded) was presented in the center
of the screen. The outcome phase was followed by an ITI (3–7 s jittered). There
were 120 trials with an average trial time of 21.5 s, resulting in a scanning time
of 43 min.
fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
fMRI data were acquired using standard procedures reported in full in the
Supplemental Data. The repetition time for acquiring fMRI volumes was 3 s.
fMRI analysis was carried out using FMRIB’s Software Library (FSL) (Smith
et al., 2004). Conservative independent component analysis was performed
using MELODIC to identify and remove obvious motion artifacts (Damoiseaux
et al., 2006). Data were then preprocessed using the default options in FSL:
motion correction was applied using rigid body registration to the central
volume (Jenkinson et al., 2002); Gaussian spatial smoothing was applied
with a full-width half-maximum of 5 mm; brain matter was segmented fromnonbrain using a mesh deformation approach (Smith, 2002); high-pass
temporal filtering was applied using a Gaussian-weighted running lines filter,
with a 3 dB cutoff of 100 s.
Separate general linear models (GLMs) were fit in prewhitened data space
for probability and expected value metrics (Woolrich et al., 2001). Because
probability should theoretically be tracked throughout and across trials, this
metric was modeled as a prolonged response. In the GLM for unchosen prob-
ability, 11 regressors were included: the main effect of the trial, lasting the
duration of the trial, the interaction of demeaned log chosen probability (in-
ferred by the model) and the trial, the interaction of demeaned log unchosen
probability (inferred by the model) and the trial, left and right response regres-
sors, and six motion regressors produced during realignment. The means of
each regressor listed above, as well as an additional contrast of parameter
estimates (COPE) which defined the relative unchosen probability as the log
ratio between unchosen and chosen action probabilities, were included in
the analysis. Because rewardmagnitudes were generated randomly and could
not be tracked across trials, the expected value should theoretically only be
relevant to decisions between trial onset and subject response. This metric
was therefore modeled during the decision phase. This second GLM, con-
structed to identify brain activity associated with the expected value, con-
tained 13 regressors: the main effect of the decide phase, the interval phase,
and the monitor phase, the interaction between demeaned subjective chosen
expected value (inferred by the model) and the decide phase, the interaction
between demeaned subjective unchosen expected value (inferred by the
model) and the decide phase, left and right responses, and six motion regres-
sors. Again, COPEs were included for the mean of each above regressor, and
an additional COPE defined the relative chosen value as the difference
between chosen and unchosen value regressors. Aside from the motion
regressors, all regressors were convolved with the FSL default hemodynamic
response function (Gamma function, delay = 6 s, standard deviation = 3 s), and
filtered by the same high-pass filter as the data.
For group analyses, EPI images were first registered to the high-resolution
structural image using 7 of freedom and then to the standard (Montreal
Neurological Institute [MNI]) space MNI152 template using affine registration
with 12 of freedom (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001). We then fit a GLM to esti-
mate the group mean effects for the regressors described above. FMRIB’s
Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME) was used to perform a mixed-effects
group analysis that models both ‘‘fixed effects’’ (i.e., within-subject) variance
and ‘‘random effects’’ (i.e., between subject) variance (Beckmann et al.,
2003; Woolrich et al., 2004). All reported fMRI Z-statistics and p values arose
from thesemixed effects analyses on all 18 subjects. Inference was carried out
using Gaussian random-field theory and cluster-based thresholding, using
a cluster-based threshold of Z > 2.8 and a whole-brain corrected cluster
significance threshold of p < 0.05 (Worsley et al., 1992).
Region of Interest Analyses
ROI analyses were conducted on significant clusters of activation identified
from the whole-brain voxelwise analysis in order to determine the nature of
BOLD fluctuations in these regions. In each subject, we averaged BOLD
data from a 27 voxel cube centered on the local maximum back-projected
from the FPC, mid-IPS, and vmPFC activations identified by the regressions
of interest. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried out to test for differ-
ences between left- and right-lateralized ROIs in the FPC and mid-IPS. These
revealed no difference in effect sizes between left and right frontopolar regions
at any phase of the trial (region3 trial phase interaction: F2,34 = 0.31; p = 0.695;
main effect of region: F1,17 = 0.958, p = 0.31) or between left and right mid-IPS
regions at any phase of the trial (region3 trial phase interaction: F2,34 = 1.653,
p = 0.206; main effect of region: F1,17 = 0.123 p = 0.73). We therefore averaged
frontopolar and mid-IPS ROIs across hemispheres to produce a single FPC
ROI and a single mid-IPS ROI.
Each subject’s BOLD time series was then divided into trials, which were
resampled to a duration of 21.5 s, such that the decision was presented at
0 s, the response was made at 7.5 s, and the outcome was presented from
13.5 to 16.5 s, as these were the mean timings for each event across trials
and subjects. The resampling resolution was 100 ms. A general linear model
was then fit across trials at every time point in each subject independentlyNeuron 62, 733–743, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 741
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sizes at each time point, and their standard errors.
To produce the time series of correlation in Figure 3, we constructed
a general linear model in which the dependent variable was a matrix
comprising the FPC effect size for the relative unchosen probability at every
time point in the trial in each subject and the predictor was a vector comprising
the behavioral index of interest for each subject. The correlation between the
FPC effect size and behavioral index was then plotted at each time point in the
trial. To produce scatter plots in Figure 3, we fit a canonical hemodynamic
response function (Gamma function, delay = 6 s, standard deviation = 3 s) at
the onset of the ITI to the time series of the parameter estimate in the FPC in
each subject (Figure S5). The corresponding effect size for the relative un-
chosen probability in the FPC during the ITI was then plotted against the
behavioral index of interest.
Details of the functional connectivity analysis can be found in the Supple-
mental Data.
Behavioral Model
We used a Bayesian reinforcement-learning algorithm (Behrens et al., 2007) to
model subject estimates of the reward probabilities and their eventual choices.
This model has two components: a ‘‘predictor’’ that estimates the reward
probability associated with each option and other environmental statistics
given only the observed data and a ‘‘selector’’ that chooses actions on the
basis of these estimates. Our approach assumes that the predictor estimates
the reward probabilities and other statistics in a Markovian fashion. On any
given trial, the predictor only requires a current estimate of (or belief in) the
reward probabilities, the volatility of the environment, and the distrust in the
constancy of the volatility of the environment to represent the entire history
of previous rewards (see Supplemental Data for an algebraic description).
These estimates of the reward probabilities were then combined with reward
magnitude according to subject-specific free parameters that can differentially
weigh probability and magnitude, corresponding to risk-averse and risk-prone
behavior, respectively, to derive estimates of the subjective expected action
values (Supplemental Data). Finally, the selector assumed that subjects gener-
ated actions according to the following sigmoidal probability distribution:
PðC= LeftÞ= 1=1+ expð  gleft

; (1)
where gleft is the subjective expected value of the left option.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
Supplemental Data include Supplemental Experimental Procedures, six
figures, and two tables and can be found with this article online at http://
www.cell.com/neuron/supplemental/S0896-6273(09)00389-4.
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